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Abstract 
It has long been known that English Cistercian monasteries often sold their wool in advance to foreign 
merchants in the late thirteenth century.  The abbey of Pipewell in Northamptonshire features in a number 
of such contracts with Cahorsin merchants.  This paper looks again at these contracts in the context of 
over 200 other such agreements found in the governmental records.  Why did Pipewell descend into 
penury over this fifty year period?  This case study demonstrates that the promise of ready cash for their 
most valuable commodity led such abbots to make ambitious agreements – taking on yet more debt to 
service existing creditors - that would lead to their eventual bankruptcy. 
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‘Remember dearest brethren and reverend fathers that by the said recognisances and due to seven 
years of dearth and common murrain of beasts, the goods of the house of Pipewell had been so 
exhausted that nothing remained for the meagre sustenance of the monks; sometimes they sat in 
the refectory for three or four days with only black bread and potage, at other times they 
wandered from market to market to buy bread, and this they patiently endured.  I, the wretch and 
sinner who have occupied the place of abbot, therefore counsel, ask, implore, and warn in as 
much as I am able, lest another abbot fall so deeply into the hands of Lombards, that they heed 
the French maxim “leger est aprendre mes fort est a rendre.”’1 
 
Here, in the words of William of Lawford, the recently deposed abbot of the Cistercian monastery of 
Pipewell in Northamptonshire
2
, we have a most distressing English witness to the agrarian calamity 
sweeping Europe in the early fourteenth century. This candid mixture of apology and exhortation, 
moreover, resonates in the crises of monastic finance prevalent over the previous fifty years and 
emphasises human frailty over environmental factors in the accumulation of the debts responsible for the 
three-year dispersal of the convent ‘pretextu paupertatis’ in September 1323.3  How did such frailty 
manifest itself? 
Crammed onto a blank folio of a late-thirteenth century cartulary, Lawford’s lament conspicuously 
follows a list of fifteen recognisances for debt, totalling around £2400, amassed since 1314.  Most relate 
to wool that his predecessors had sold but struggled to deliver.  Prepared to the highest standard, 
Cistercian wool encouraged merchants from across Europe to invest huge amounts of capital to fuel the 
burgeoning luxury cloth trade in the Low Countries.  Business partners exchanged vast numbers of sacks 
                                                 
1 ‘It is easy to take but hard to give’: London, British Library, Stowe MS 937, f. 143v., ‘Memorandum fratres carissimi patresque 
reverendi quod per predicas recogniciones et propter vij annorum sterilitates et per communem morinam bestiarum, bona domus 
de Pipewell’ adeo fuerunt consumpta, que eorum residuum non sufficiebat ad exilem dicte domus monachorum sustentacionem, 
set aliquando sedebant in refectorio per iii vel iiij dies cum nigro pane et potagio tantum et aliquando emebant panem suum de 
foro ad forum, et hoc omnia pacienter sustinuerunt.  Hinc est quod ego miser et precator qui aliquando occupavi locum abbatis 
consulo, rogo, supplico, et quatenus possum moneo ne aliquis abbas de cetero ita profunde concidat in manus Lumbaudorum, 
quia gallice dicitur leger est aprendre mes fort est arendre.’ 
2 William was deposed on 24 April 1323: BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, f. 161r. 
3 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, f. 150r. 
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for delivery within a few months or even up to twenty years with large cash advances.  Historians of both 
the English and the monastic economy have long suggested that, in exploiting their most lucrative asset 
on local and international markets, Cistercian abbots dynamised English export trade and credit networks, 
particularly in the half-century either side of 1300. But such agreements led the abbots to enter a vicious 
circle where such advances – generally viewed as loans against the security of wool – initially sunk into 
building and maintenance expenses and meeting royal and papal tax demands, increasingly serviced debts 
accumulated by previous unpaid advances.
4
  Virulent sheep disease struck four times between 1258 and 
1317, ravaging flocks, reducing supplies of wool available for the market, and so threatening to sever the 
credit links feeding the monastic economy in Britain.
5
 
For some monastic historians such transactions epitomised the alienation of the Cistercian Order 
from the original ‘ideals’ of seclusion and self-sufficiency established in the twelfth century.6  Extensive 
credit relationships potentially embroiled abbots in usury, as wool contracts often disguised hidden 
interest charges
7
, promoting accusations of greed and financial mismanagement.  Dispersal, became a fate 
common to several English Cistercian monasteries in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries.
 8
   
Kirkstall and Rievaulx (Yorks.) dispersed in 1281 and 1292 respectively, while the General Chapter 
received petitions to that end from Vaudey (Lincs.) in 1280, Flaxley (Gloucs.) in 1281, Fountains 
(Yorks.) in 1291, and Bruern (Oxon.) in 1293.
9
  Coburn Graves, however, argues that dispersal was not 
                                                 
4 R.J. Whitwell, ‘English Monasteries and the Wool Trade in the 13th Century,’ Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2 (1904), 1-33; R.A. Donkin, The Cistercians: Studies in the Geography of Medieval England and Wales 
(Toronto, 1978), 17; T.H. Lloyd, The Wool Trade in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1978), 288-312. 
5 Ian Kershaw, ‘The Great European Famine and Agrarian Crisis in England, 1315-1322,’ Past & Present 59 (1973), 27. 
6 David Knowles, The Religious Orders in England, II (Cambridge, 1948), 68; J.E. Madden, ‘Business Monks, Banker Monks, 
Bankrupt Monks: The English Cistercians in the Thirteenth Century,’ Catholic Historical Review 49 (3) (1963), 341-64. 
7 Our own research into these ‘forward’ contracts has demonstrated that interest was being charged at a level of between 17% 
and 20% - which would appear to be reasonable for this period.  For a summary of these findings see Adrian R. Bell, Chris 
Brooks and Paul R. Dryburgh, ‘Why forwards really came from the past’, Professional Investor (April 2005), 22-26 and for 
more detail, ‘Interest Rates and Efficiency in Medieval Wool  Forward Contracts’, Journal of Banking and Finance 
(Forthcoming).   
8
 It has been shown that as a reaction to the agrarian crisis, dispersal was a continental wide issue for monasteries in the early 
fourteenth century.  For instance, the Cistercian Abbey’s of Villers at Tilly in Brabant and Val Saint-Lambert in Liégeois were 
dispersed between 1315-1316: William Jordan, The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century (Princeton, 
1996), 70-71. 
9 Guy Barnes, Kirkstall Abbey, 1147-1539: An Historical Study (Leeds: Publications of the Thoresby Society, LVIII, no. 128, 
1984), 43-5; Statuta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Cisterciensis ab anno 1116 ad annum 1786, ed. J. Canivez (Louvain, 
1934), III, 202 (1280: 44), 215 (1281: 63), 258 (1291: 61 (Rievaulx), 62 (Fountains), 266 (1293: 31). 
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the penalty it appeared and represented ‘a normal event, even if an unhappy one’ in Cistercian history.10  
Sanctioned by the Cistercian General Chapter, dispersal reduced ordinary expenditure and released 
resources for debt resettlement by sending the brethren to seek sustenance in other houses of the Order.
11
  
Whilst essentially therefore a temporary resort, rarely have the often tortuous processes and myriad 
combination of factors creating penury, or the undulations between indebtedness, recovery, and disaster, 
been charted in detail. 
In a recent examination of the wool sales which crippled Rievaulx abbey in the late-thirteenth 
century, Emilia Jamroziak, however, concludes that the abbey’s economy and future financial wellbeing 
were bound inextricably to raising credit through wool regardless of the short-term damage this 
wrought.
12
  Rievaulx, of course, one of the great Yorkshire houses of international renown, enjoyed 
sprawling pastures suitable for grazing thousands of sheep and forged business contacts with Florentine 
and Lucchese merchant courtiers.  However, not all Cistercian houses were as suited to large-scale wool 
production or to consistently luring Italian silver.  Pipewell, a house of lesser means, was one such place.  
Nevertheless, successive abbots forged an infamous business partnership with a group of southern French 
merchants, which became ingrained into the abbey’s economic fabric for over five decades.  Oscillating 
between profitability and financial paralysis, and threatening dispersal in 1296 and 1328, its ramifications 
dictated abbatial policy and possibly transcended the profit-driven motives of many such deals.  This 
article examines the creation, development, and consequences of this partnership from a wide variety of 
sources, investigating mechanisms of trade, indebtedness, and debt resolution, and assesses whether an 
unwillingness to forsake its potential plunged Pipewell into the financial morass. 
 
Last-listed of Lawford’s fifteen recognisances is a bond for £213 and twenty-two sacks of wool owed 
to William Servat of Quercy.  This represented the arrears of the most famous advance wool contract 
                                                 
10 C.V. Graves, ‘The Economic Activities of the Cistercians in medieval England (1128-1307), Analecta Sacri Ordinis 
Cisterciensis 13 (1957), 37. 
11 L.J. Lekai, The Cistercians: Ideals and Reality (Dallas, 1977), 304-5.  In 1189 the General Chapter stipulated convents could 
only be dispersed by ‘due investigation and authorization’, an order reiterated in 1269: Statuta, I: 114 (1189: 18), III: 71 (1269: 
15). 
12 Emilia Jamroziak, ‘Rievaulx Abbey as a Wool Producer in the Late Thirteenth Century: Cistercians, Sheep, and Debts,’ 
Northern History XL: 2 (September 2003), 197-218. 
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from a surviving corpus of well over 200 documents.
13
  On 28 February 1291, the verdict of a panel of 
arbitration convened by Edward I to settle a dispute between John de Hillun, abbot of Pipewell, and a 
partnership of the Cahorsin merchants Arnaud de Soliz, Jean de Redole, Gerard de Briole and William 
Servat, concerning breach of a wool contract, was enrolled onto the Close Rolls of the English 
chancery.
14
  Subsequently published in calendar form
15
, this has regularly attracted the attention of 
historians because the restructured contract, whilst sharing basic elements with contemporary agreements, 
has unique features which provide a window into the medieval woollen industry and monastic credit.
16
  
Only T.H. Lloyd, however, traced the original contract drafted twenty-six months earlier, and it is these 
details that must guide the discussion. 
On 12 November 1288, John de Hillun bound himself to deliver 360 sacks to the Cahorsins over the 
next fifteen years.
17
  Nine sacks of good wool, three sacks of middle-grade, seven of locks (the straggly 
parts of the fleece that fell from the sheep before shearing)
18
, and five of tayller
19
 wool made up each 
annual delivery.  Priced at eighteen marks in the first five years and twenty-one marks thereafter, good 
wool would be delivered each year on 22 July at the Boston fair, along with middling wool priced at 
twelve-and-a-half marks for the first five years and fourteen thereafter, locks priced initially at ten marks 
and then at thirteen, and tayller priced at twelve marks per sack only in the final ten years.  In return, the 
merchants agreed to pay a series of complex advances to be offset against the delivery of wool and to 
provide a tun of wine each year.  Two initial advances of £120 (in earnest money) and £160 (as a loan) 
had been forwarded before the enrolment, which were to be allowed to the merchants annually in the 
delivery of wool.  Additional advances of £63 6s. 8d. and £73 6s. 8d. were to be made on Sunday after 
                                                 
13 While such agreements have been common currency for over a century, the extent of the surviving corpus – over one-third of 
which concerns Cistercian abbeys – has never been fully collated.  This omission will soon be rectified: Advance Contracts for 
the Sale of Wool in Medieval England, c. 1200-1330, ed. A. R. Bell, C. Brooks & P. Dryburgh (List & Index Society, 2006) and 
available online as study no. 5325 in the UK Data Archive catalogue at: www.data-archive.ac.uk.  Pipewell is featured as the 
selling party in eight of these contracts.  The monastic growers outstrip lay growers in these contracts, agreeing to supply 5330 
sacks as opposed to just 843 sacks. 
14 London, The National Archives, C 54/108, mm. 8d.-9d. Also E 159/64, rot. 10; E 368/62, rot. 14.  All subsequent references 
are to TNA documents unless stated. Advance Contracts, no. 133. 
15 Calendar of the Close Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, 1288-96 (London, 1904), 192-5. 
16 Graves, ‘Economic Activities,’ 31-3; Lloyd, Wool Trade, 295-6. 
17
 E 159/62, rot. 4.  Advance Contracts, no. 110. 
18 ‘que cadent de ovibus in locacione et ante tonsionem’. 
19 Wool pressed into the common wool: ‘brusetur inter communem lanam.’ 
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Martinmas and Sunday after Easter each year.  The monks were to accommodate the merchants’ dresser 
who was to supervise the clip and prepare it for delivery.  They were to receive and husband 733 sheep 
provided by the merchants, who would contribute half of their maintenance costs with the intention that 
both the wool and any issue would be split between the two parties annually.  At the end of the contract, 
all surviving sheep and the profits of their sale would be divided equally. 
Second in quantity only to the 400 sacks sold by the Cluniac prior of Lewes to the Riccardi of Lucca, 
this contract was potentially the most lucrative of all surviving agreements.
20
  For wool valued at £3445, 
the Cahorsins paid £280 upfront and promised a further £2050 in advance over the course of the contract, 
leaving them a final £1115 to settle at £74 6s. 8d. a year.  Why, though, did the monks incur such an 
enormous debt if only two years later they were unable to deliver?  Why did the merchants invest so 
much capital when problems must already have been evident?  Both the contract itself and the factors 
promoting it provide the key. 
Before moving on, though, it is important to place these contracts within the corpus of evidence for 
the history of the abbey’s involvement with wool.  Governmental sources allow the processes of trade 
and credit to be followed closely.  The exchequer court, in particular, seems to have been the primary 
mechanism employed by foreign merchants in registering contracts and prosecuting defaulters, and its 
Plea (E 13) and Memoranda Rolls (E 159, 368) supply a rich paper trail.  Pipewell abbey itself had a 
productive scriptorium.  Three cartularies survive from the mid-late thirteenth century.
21
  A further 
register was probably in the process of compilation throughout the thirteenth and early-fourteenth 
centuries as Lawford’s scrawl confirms.22  Perhaps the most important is a chronicle and register of 
documents compiled towards the middle of the fourteenth century either by, or for, Abbot Nicholas 
(1323-50).
23
  It needs to be treated with caution, for its purpose seems to be to exonerate Nicholas from 
blame for the dispersal, which he had overseen, and also, in its opening tirade, for the destruction of the 
                                                 
20 E 159/61, rot. 14 (Michaelmas term 1287).  Advance Contracts, no. 104. 
21 BL Cotton MS Caligula A XII, ff. 2-159v.; A XIII; Additional MS 37022. 
22 BL Stowe MS 937. 
23 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, ff. 150r-205r.  It must have been completed by 1343, as a different hand inserts evidence 
concerning a plea not resolved until that year: f. 196v. 
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abbey’s woodland over the past 180 years.24  It is therefore coloured by the compiler’s experiences of the 
harshness of existence brought on by debt and famine and by an attempt to counter dissent in the convent 
in the mid-1330s
25
 by pinning the blame principally on William Lawford.
26
  It is, however, our sole 
surviving narrative.  The compiler had access to, and employed, previous abbots’ annual account rolls, 
cellarers’ stock accounts and bursars’ rolls, which have now been lost.27  His distillation of information 
mined from surviving muniments is dextrous and his evidence concerning recognisances and land 
transfers can be independently corroborated.  Its survival makes Pipewell’s experiences with debt and the 
wool trade arguably the best documented house in England. 
 
Like many other houses of the Order, sheep farming was naturally concomitant with the abbey’s 
foundation and development.
28
  Sited on the fringes of Rockingham forest, Pipewell, with its heavy clay 
soils, was not wholly conducive to arable cultivation and fostered a mixed economy.
29
  While Pipewell’s 
founders in 1143 sought seclusion and the self-sufficient existence dictated by the early capitula of the 
Order, which condoned solely manual labour, animal husbandry and the tilling of the soil, its estates 
could not always meet the subsistence needs of the community.
30
  Though the late-twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries witnessed considerable forest clearance and assarting of land to extend the area under 
cultivation
31
, frequently in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries abbots had to buy grain to 
sustain the convent.  During the Barons’ War, the abbot of Croxden (Staffs.) sold Abbot Gerard (1256-9) 
all of his grain at Tugby (Leics.) for one year.  From 1308-11, the monks regularly purchased poor-grade 
grain at high prices.
32
  Moreover, although successive abbots contravened Cistercian legislation 
                                                 
24 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, ff. 150r.-151v., 197r. 
25 A reference survives, for example, to complaints about a lack of firewood in winter: f. 159r. 
26 ‘qui non bene se habuit in regimine domus’: f. 197r. 
27 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, ff. 151v., 158v., 161r., 161v. 
28 Donkin, Cistercians, 68-73. 
29 Glenn Foard, ‘Medieval Woodland, Agriculture and Industry in Rockingham Forest, Northamptonshire,’ Medieval 
Archaeology 45 (2001), 41-97. 
30 Lekai, The Cistercians, 26. 
31 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, ff. 150r.-152v. 
32 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, ff. 154v., 157r.  For other examples see ff. 150v., 160v., 188v. 
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forbidding the purchase of churches, tithes, villages and seigneurial dues from mills
33
, such assets could 
not match estates better-suited to sheep husbandry, which could be employed in meeting the rising costs 
of the convent. 
The monastic precinct at Pipewell stands 107-114 metres above sea-level.  The main bulk of its 
estates straddles the border between Northamptonshire and Warwickshire southwest of the abbey, 
covering the heathland which rises to 200 metres near Cold Ashby before sloping down to the banks of 
the Avon north of Rugby.  The majority of its granges are situated in this area and enjoyed sizeable 
pastures and sheepfolds.  Alongside the home granges of East Grange and West Grange, two main groups 
stand out: a Northamptonshire upland cluster containing Braybrooke, Cold Ashby, Elkington, and 
Winwick; and a Warwickshire riverside cluster of Rugby, Newbold, Dunchurch, Cawston, and Church, 
Little, and Long Lawford.  In Northamptonshire, the monks pastured 180 of Richard de Hensa’s ewes 
with their own sheep early in the thirteenth century at Yelvertoft, while in Winwick Randolph de 
Blockeville granted them pasture for 720 sheep.
34
  Nearer the abbey, 120 sheep were pastured at Oakley 
and a further 250 of the abbey’s beasts at Benefield.35  In Warwickshire, 300 ewes grazed at Bilton and 
another 300 on Cawston Heath, while at Long Lawford there was pasture for 1000 sheep.  In the first half 
of the thirteenth century, 200 sheep from their sheepfolds at Marram were held with sheep of the lord of 
Rugby.
36
 
In total, evidence survives of pasture for over 3000 sheep.  Translating this into production capacity 
is difficult, however, and should not be taken as an upper or lower limit.  Cartulary figures of grants of 
pasture do not translate into flock size, as fluctuations in climate and disease shaped flocks, which often 
dipped below this number.  No evidence survives, moreover, of the weights and measures used at 
Pipewell and even locally there were variations from the accepted sack weight of 26 stones, at 14 lbs. per 
stone.  In 1290, two Londoners sold six sacks to the Riccardi from the pastures of Rothwell, in which 
                                                 
33 Outlawed as early as 1134: Statuta, I, 14-15.  For Pipewell’s seigneurial instruments: E 326/2655, 2706, 2712 (vills of 
Newbold, Little Lawford, Harborough); E 326/8825, E 329/188 (tithes in Cold Ashby); E 327/55 (Cold Ashby, Elkington and 
Thornby); BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, ff. 157r. (mill at Oakley), 158v. (Rugby), 159v. (Roxton, Barford, Desborough, Little 
Lawford), 160r. (Church Lawford), 163r. (Rothwell), 183v. (Winwick). 
34 BL Cotton MS Caligula A XIII, f. 43r.; Otho B xiv, f. 183v. 
35 BL Cotton MS Otho B xiv, f. 164r. 
36 BL Cotton MS Caligula A XIII, f. 80r. (Bilton); Otho B xiv, ff. 157v. (Cawston Heath), 191r. (Marram, Long Lawford). 
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hundred Pipewell lies, and each sack was to contain 30 stones at 13 lbs. per stone.
37
  While Lloyd has 
calculated the average fleece size as something just under 2 lbs., variations in breed, climate, pasture, and 
nutrition created a lack of uniformity.
38
  Even with these qualifications, possible flock size and capacity 
can be assessed.  An average sack of standard weight probably contained 200-260 fleeces.
39
  For Pipewell 
to have filled the twenty-four sacks they promised to the Cahorsins from their own sheep would require 
around 5500 sheep.  But a more realistic contemporary estimate by a Florentine merchant puts annual 
output at fourteen sacks, commensurate with a flock of just over 3000 sheep.
40
  To put this into context, 
Meaux (Yorks.) kept a flock touching 11000 in 1280, Rievaulx had over 5000 by the same year, Kirkstall 
around 6500 by 1320, while the Benedictine fenland behemoth, Crowland, boasted 16000 sheep before 
scab hit in the 1270s.
41
  Converting these into annual output Pegolotti gives respective totals of twenty-
five, sixty, twenty-five, and thirty sacks.
42
 
It was clear, therefore, that both locally and nationally abbots of Pipewell possessed a marketable 
commodity of high quality.  Medieval wool pricing evidence, the main arbiter of quality, is sparse 
however.
43
  Fortunately, two price schedules for wool marketed by monastic producers survive and both, 
when taken with the contract, suggest that, while Pipewell never attained the front rank in production, its 
wool was among the most respected. 
Sometime in the late-1330s Francisco Balducci Pegolotti, a leading light in the Bardi company of 
Florence, prepared a handbook for merchants trading across Europe.  Drawing on his experience as a 
Bardi agent in London from 1317-21, which included the agreement of at least one contract with Pipewell 
in 1318
44
, and on information dating to the 1280s
45
, he inserted a list of 200 British monastic wool 
                                                 
37 E 159/63, rot. 25d; E 368/61, rot. 29.  Advance Contracts, no. 119. 
38 T.H. Lloyd, The Movement of Wool Prices in Medieval England (Economic History Review Supplement 6: Cambridge, 1973), 
2. 
39 The Augustinian prior of Wroxton (Oxon.) sold 1820 fleeces to the Spaniard, Peter de Mundenard, in 1280, laden into six 
sacks of 260 fleeces each: E 13/8, m. 15d.  Advance Contracts, no. 44. 
40 Francisco Balducci Pegolotti, La Pratica Della Mercatura, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), 262. 
41 Bryan Waites, ‘Monasteries and the Wool Trade in North and East Yorkshire during the 13th and 14th Centuries,’ Yorkshire 
Archaeological Journal 52 (1980), 112; Jamroziak, ‘Rievaulx Abbey,’ 208; Barnes, Kirkstall Abbey, 40; Eileen Power, The Wool 
Trade in English Medieval History (Oxford, 1941), 35. 
42 La Practica Della Mercatura, 260, 268. 
43 Lloyd, Movement of Wool Prices; J. H. Munro, ‘Wool-Price Schedules and the Quality of English Wools in the Later Middle 
Ages, c. 1270-1499,’ Textile History 9 (1978), 118-69. 
44 CCR, 1318-23, 94. 
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producers with prices for 194 of them.
46
  They include seventy-seven Cistercian monasteries and 
nunneries.  Its good wool being valued at twenty-two marks, Pipewell ranks ninth among Cistercians.  
Only two other houses nationwide surpassed this value, confirming Pipewell’s position within the top 6% 
of monastic wool producers.  Pegolotti, however, explicitly states that his prices are those on the Flemish 
market and that the costs of carriage and a good profit should be factored in.
47
  His prices may therefore 
be inflated.  But, even if, as Munro suggests, shipping, marketing and taxation charges account for around 
20% of the value of each sack sold in Flanders, the domestic price of Pipewell wool at around seventeen 
marks (which tallies with the initial lower sale price agreed with the Cahorsins in 1288) would still have 
competed with other leading wool producers, as an exchequer schedule of 1294 demonstrates.
48
 
In June 1294, as Edward I stockpiled assets to finance war with Philip IV in Gascony, he seized the 
wool of foreign merchants then in England and forced representatives of ten Italian companies to submit 
details of their current wool contracts to inform him of the finances he could muster.
49
  Their submissions 
list 133 monastic producers, fifty-seven of which are Cistercian.
50
  Pipewell’s absence, however, suggests 
that Cahorsin cash had secured its wool.  Nevertheless, if we were to take seventeen marks as 
representing the value of each Pipewell sack, it would slot in as eleventh among Cistercians and 
seventeenth across all Orders.  Taking the stated contract value of twenty-one marks raises the abbey to 
second among Cistercians and third nationwide. 
 
Possibly the earliest surviving indenture for an advance sale of wool, indeed, concerns Pipewell 
abbey.  At Candlemas 1242 Abbot William sold the coming year’s clip to two prominent Londoners for 
an advance of £80.
51
  In so doing, he flouted long-standing Cistercian legislation against the taking of 
money in advance of delivery of wool, a practice outlawed in 1189 for deals stretching over a year as 
they threatened to immerse abbeys in debt and embroil them in usury.  As the thirteenth century 
                                                                                                                                                             
45 Munro, ‘Wool-Price Schedules,’ 134-5. 
46 La Pratica Della Mercatura, 258-69. 
47 La Pratica Della Mercatura, 269. 
48 Munro, ‘Wool-Price Schedules,’ 125. 
49 E 159/68, rot. 82; M.C. Prestwich, Edward I (Newhaven & London, 1997), 377-81. 
50 E 101/126/7, mm. 11-25.  Advance Contracts, Appendix I. 
51 E 327/541.  Advance Contracts, no. 221. 
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progressed, fewer abbots took heed of this prohibition, provoking a restatement in 1277.  A year later 
sales were licensed for longer periods, although payments were only to be accepted for one year.  
Pressure from abbeys whose flocks were suffering from scab ultimately forced the General Chapter into 
allowing receipt of larger sums on condition they were applied to reducing debt.
52
  Such flexibility tacitly 
acknowledged the importance credit had in monastic finances, as abbots had long been accessing 
privileges to secure their place in the wool market.   
As an earlier example of this, on 20 March 1235, Henry III awarded Pipewell freedom from toll, 
passage, and pontage throughout his realm, which made carriage by road, river, and sea, and thus export, 
much cheaper.  Equally as important was the exemption of sheep from distraint if the abbey possessed 
other animals or chattels by which debts could be met.
53
  This threw abbots a lifeline in times of 
impending penury.  Both, therefore, made them more attractive to buyers, and were privileges 
voraciously sought by many Cistercian houses as they became more deeply involved in selling wool.
54
  
But, even without them, Pipewell’s wool would always have suitors.  After the gradual loss of Flemish 
custom in the wake of the crises of the early-1270s, it must have been reasonable to expect that the liquid 
capital accompanying Italian merchant companies into England would have found a home at Pipewell.  
The most successful company under Edward I, the Riccardi of Lucca, who had business connections in 
most counties, were active in Northamptonshire and Warwickshire.
55
  But, the evidence suggests that 
Pipewell was sought out by southern French merchants to the exclusion of all others. 
Servat, Soliz, Redole, and Briole formed one of a number of fluid merchant partnerships from the 
region of Cahors in southern France.
56
  For a century their predecessors had imported wine, cables, and 
cords into England in return for wool, cementing their involvement in the burgeoning cloth trade of the 
North Sea world.
57
  They had also penetrated the Northamptonshire wool market.  In October 1259 
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Stephen Chaendut sold six sacks of wool ‘de patria de Northamtonia’ to Imbert Delderoc, William 
Fresepayn, and Arnaud Griffun, merchants of Cahors.
58
  Such men must have established long-term 
business contacts, information strands, and local knowledge in many parts of the country, and 
particularly so once they became resident.   
In 1281, Servat and William Tournemire, keeper of the royal mint, were permitted to render their 
accounts ‘according to the custom of the exchequer’, granting them the privileged access to speedy 
jurisdiction which some Italian merchants had acquired.
59
 This would enable them to obtain a prime 
position in royal financial affairs, as they would be treated as privileged suitors at the Exchequer court, 
and their debts would be treated as those of the king.  Access to the exchequer process ensured a more 
rapid judgment and recovery in cases of default.  Servat later accompanied Anthony Bek, bishop of 
Durham, on embassies to Norway to negotiate the ill-fated marriage alliance between Margaret, heiress 
to the Scottish throne, and Edward of Caernarfon, heir to the throne.
60
 
To have formed an association with such cosmopolitan, well-connected men must have 
considerably appealed to the monks of Pipewell, offering access to a reliable source of capital and 
influential patrons.  For the Cahorsins, the deal promised a steady stream of high quality wool at a 
constant price.  And yet, neither supply nor demand were so weak as to force them together.  Both 
parties could surely have persuaded others to undertake such serious investment.  We should look more 
deeply into the reasons behind their relationship. 
Traditionally, recognisances such as that of November 1288 have been viewed as results of 
successful prosecutions by merchants desperate to recoup their investment against defaulters.  In an era 
of recurrent sheep scab, a skin disease rendering fleeces useless, merchants used the mechanisms of the 
exchequer either to compel monastic communities to honour their bargain by binding themselves, the 
house, and their successors, effectively mortgaging their future, or to submit to penalty charges.  This 
seems applicable to the arbitrated settlement of February 1291.  Lloyd, however, argues many such 
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recognisances were ‘simple registrations of contracts’ recording the mutual obligations of both 
parties.
61
  This better fits the recognisance of November 1288 where the direct investment in sheep is 
unusual and, arguably, indicative of longer-term commitment. 
By the terms of the original contract, the merchants were to provide 733 sheep to be pastured with 
the monastic flock.  As at Kirkstall, where Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln, stepped in after its flock had 
been annihilated by scab by 1284, restoring it to a pre-disease level within twenty years, such large-
scale purchases tend to be associated with restocking in the aftermath of epidemics.
62
  Murrain struck 
in 1258, 1277, and 1283, decimating flocks nationwide.
63
  While the effect of disease at Pipewell 
before 1296 is inestimable, twelve miles away at Wellingborough, mortality reduced the flock of 
Crowland abbey by an annual average of 15% between 1280 and 1285, peaking at 20% in 1281.
64
  
Young sheep were particularly badly affected: in 1282 35% of the manor’s hoggets were slaughtered 
and in the following year 23% of lambs died.  If such mortality were reflected at Pipewell, the flock 
would struggle to meet the demands made of it. 
To counter this, both parties aimed to create a breeding flock, conditions in the contract stipulating 
that the imported sheep were to be kept with the abbey’s flock until they reached 2000, whereupon they 
were to be divided equally and wool and issue sold to dual profit.  The fleeces of animals dying during 
any year were to be sold and reinvested in new sheep.  Clearly, they had a vision of sustainable stock 
management to ensure a return on their investment, which was not an overnight development.  On 28 
June 1280, the rectors of Elkington, Cold Ashby, and Thornby remitted to the abbey exaction of tithes 
on the produce of all sheep grazing in their parishes, whether the sheep belonged to the monks or to 
‘certain merchants.’65  The dorse reveals that these were ‘ovium mercatorum de Caturco.’  Although 
these sheep had never yet been pastured in their parishes, this implies that the abbot had negotiated a 
deal with the merchants and had persuaded the rectors to facilitate the plan.  It is possible, therefore, 
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that Cahorsin sheep grazed at Pipewell some years before the first official contract.  Such sustained 
interest suggests that the merchants, far from engaging in transitory business, envisaged a relationship 
of mutual benefit to both parties. 
In an atmosphere of declining production
66
, during which it had been squeezed by the Italian 
societies, whose international connections and greater liquidity had helped them wrest many wool 
contracts formerly held by Flemings, the Cahorsin market share was threatened.  Financial difficulties 
may have consequently beset them.  At Michaelmas 1287, Arnaud de Soliz received permission to have 
his debtors distrained to render their debts before the exchequer.  On 5 July 1289, Arnaud bound 
himself and his brother to repay Jean de Redole the arrears of debts he had incurred on their behalf in 
the Bar fair from 1285.
67
  As his principal security for repayment, Arnaud pledged the wool he had 
recently bought from Pipewell, even though the date for the first delivery was weeks away.  More 
significantly, during Edward I’s Welsh campaigns, Cahorsin merchants had loaned the king around 
£2800.
68
  Conversely, the capital investment required for the purchase of Pipewell’s wool and in 
sourcing and buying sheep hints that the contract cannot wholly represent an attempt to buy themselves 
out of trouble.   
From the convent’s viewpoint their relationship with the Cahorsins provided short and long term 
benefits.  Firstly, the initial investment perhaps resolved a mounting crisis.  In August and October 
1277, Pipewell was granted royal protection for one year.  Combined with a simultaneous remission of 
the duty to provide carts to convey victuals to supply royal forces in Wales, this suggests that the king 
wished to shelter a struggling convent from unnecessary strains.
69
  Secondly, the eventual contract gave 
the monks a guaranteed market for their best asset at a guaranteed price, a theoretical regular source of 
income facilitating more ambitious financial planning and exploitation of resources. 
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A further drain on resources was provided by Royal and episcopal visits which would have been a 
common occurrence throughout the period under discussion.
70
  These were a signal honour and lavish 
hospitality would be expected and dutifully provided, especially when extravagance was occasioned by 
pride in achievement.  For instance, on 5 April 1312, Thomas, earl of Lancaster, and William de Ros of 
Helmsley headed a huge gathering at Pipewell for the dedication of the abbey churchyard, close, and 
chapter-house.  Commenting on this event twenty years on, Abbot Nicholas sardonically observes that 
‘no one knows how much was spent on this day.’71 
This solemn celebration showed off the abbey’s new buildings, the abbey church reconstruction 
having been completed a year earlier.  Cistercian architecture progressed apace during the thirteenth 
century and many abbeys undertook expensive building projects.  The sheer scale of such construction 
brought, as Jamroziak argues, both glory to God and the monastery itself, but equally fuelled those 
fires of indebtedness which gutted English Cistercian houses late in that century.
72
  Projects of such 
magnitude nevertheless required long-term planning and financing, a primary part of which must have 
been founded on the relationship formed with the Cahorsins in the 1280s. 
The potentially most debilitating, but most unpredictable drain on monastic finances was the 
growth of papal and royal taxation during the thirteenth century, which peaked in Edward I’s reign.  
Desperate to supplement the resources available to fund prolonged campaigns in Wales in 1277, 1282, 
and 1287, the latter of which dovetailed with war in Gascony, and, therefore, to ensure that his most 
prominent financiers, the Riccardi, retained sufficient liquidity to advance money whenever necessary, 
Edward himself increased the national tax burden upon all his subjects.
73
   Between 1279 and 1290, he 
taxed the English clergy on four occasions, to which the Cistercian Order made large contributions, 
although it was technically exempt.
74
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Obviously, the biggest burden was the contract with Servat, Soliz, and fellows.  Possibly conceived 
at a moment of optimism from a myriad of mitigating factors, the fact remains that the monks reneged 
on the deal inordinately quickly.  It is probable that problems occurred only eighteen months after its 
inception.  At nearby Wellingborough, the summer of 1290 saw the loss of 20% of Crowland abbey’s 
flock.
75
  Signs that Pipewell had been blighted came as early as January 1291 when the abbot of 
Warden (Beds.) mainperned to supply five sacks of tayller to the Cahorsins if Pipewell could not.
76
  
These negotiations may emanate from the arbitration which Edward I had initiated, possibly at the 
request of both parties – the merchants keen not to lose their investment, and the convent willing to 
come to terms to prevent penalties incurred through no fault of their own – which culminated in the 
enrolment of the arbiters’ verdict on 28 February.  The king’s desire to secure the abbey’s future and 
protect the interests of merchants with whom he had a close financial relationship can be seen in the 
verdict’s enrolment in the chancery and exchequer.77  It was perhaps this which persuaded him to stay 
at Pipewell in the previous September.  Indeed, the re-negotiation might originate directly in 
discussions taken at that time. 
The resultant settlement seems skewed heavily in favour of the merchants.  It retains the structure 
of the previous agreement, but includes a variety of punitive clauses which point to the merchants’ 
desire to obtain firmer control of their investment.  Now, they were to receive all of the abbey’s wool 
over thirteen years.  Tailler wool, which had previously been sorted and packed separately, would be 
pressed among the remaining wool and, ‘for divers trespasses and damages perpetrated against the 
merchants,’ two gratis sacks each year would be taken from the woolsheds.  The attached condition 
that, should the monks default, the merchants would be quit of sixteen marks per sack suggests that 
these gratis sacks were taken as disguised interest.  The same might be said for the forty shillings and 
three sacks to be taken each year to make up for the merchants’ loss of one sack over the previous two 
years.  There is little doubt that the merchants were bitterly disappointed with the monks’ investment of 
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their money.  Provisions permit them free access to their dresser, whose work was not to be criticised 
or rejected.  They further dictate the construction of new wool storage facilities, ensuring that prepared 
wool is kept off the ground and well surrounded to ward off damp.  The monks’ failure to answer 
adequately for the issues of the 733 sheep originally purchased brought a re-division of the flock.  Even 
though disease had probably intervened, nine hundred of the abbey’s sheep were now to be separated 
from the remainder, marked with the signs of both parties and maintained wholly at the convent’s costs 
until a flock size of 2000 had been reached.  While the merchants would take half of the fleeces each 
year, any sheep dying were to be shorn and the fleeces sold.  Profits were to be reinvested in new 
sheep. 
Despite such stinging criticism and the merchants’ desire to stamp their will, there remains an air 
of compromise and cordiality.  The investment in sheep continued.  The advances essentially remained 
as before, although it is questionable whether the £120 advanced upon the sealing of the contract really 
represented new money, rather than a deduction from the original advance.  More importantly, the 
prices and the potential financial commitment remained stable.  In analysing the contract, Franz Arens 
contends that the merchants benefited by purchasing the wool at a preferential, discount rate 
(Vorzugspreis).
78
  If Pegolotti’s schedule originates from the last quarter of the thirteenth century, this 
cannot be wholly correct.  Even reduced by 20% for costs of carriage to Flanders and a good profit, 
Pegolotti’s price of twenty-two marks per sack of good wool would bring a domestic price of around 
seventeen marks, making the Cahorsins offer of twenty-one marks for the bulk of the contract period 
more than generous.
79
 
Having attained a stake in the economic life of the monastery, it is possible that the merchants 
wished to enjoy the accompanying spiritual benefits.  As in 1288, the merchants were to provide at 
least one, perhaps two, tuns of wine each year.  While this may have been a sweetener to induce the 
abbot to agree to the merchants’ monopoly, or simply a gift, the wine was explicitly presented for the 
celebration of Mass.  Perhaps this was a symbolic offering to expiate the merchants’ guilt in levying 
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interest.  Jamroziak speaks of the Italians who dealt with Rievaulx as outsiders who ‘never functioned 
as a part of the network of mutual obligations which existed locally.’80  At Pipewell, however, the 
commitment of the merchants to investing in the abbey and its produce perhaps involved the Cahorsins 
in ties of patronage.  By 1314, and presumably sooner, William Servat acquired five stones of wool 
each year to put towards the robe he received from the abbot.
81
  Resident in England for around fifty 
years, Servat had perhaps engaged himself in a more spiritual relationship as a patron of Pipewell, 
obtaining prayers and a place in the abbey’s martyrology. 
Unfortunately, this must remain speculation as such evidence does not survive.  The same applies 
to the immediate consequences of the compromise.  Nonetheless, the association of Pipewell with the 
Cahorsins continued until the summer of 1294.  With war looming in Gascony and Edwardian finances 
stretched by the maintenance of English hegemony in Scotland and Wales, Edward I not only banished 
all men of French blood in England, he exiled many foreign merchants, seizing their wool stocks and 
trying to appropriate the wool they had contracted for delivery after Midsummer.  A surcharge of 40s. 
per sack was placed on the export of wool too.
82
  Although the wool of Italian and Brabanter merchants 
was quickly released and the merchants rehabilitated, Edward persistently alienated French merchants.  
At a stroke, Pipewell had been shorn of the guaranteed market for its wool.  Worse still, this dovetailed 
with an economic slump and Edward I’s battle to retain liquidity in pursuit of his military aims, which 
became the immediate catalysts for the collapse of Pipewell’s finances. 
The imposition of the 40s. maltote and embargoes on trade with Flanders and other French 
territories enforced in 1294, together with the economic uncertainties flourishing in a period of 
incipient warfare, brought falling wool prices and a halving of exports in return for a large customs 
yield.  Foreign demand for wool slackened and domestic merchants were hamstrung to an extent by the 
restrictions on their trade.
83
  The wartime expansion of the national tax burden thus bit increasingly 
hard on communities struggling to find a profitable outlet for their main asset.  In July 1294 Edward 
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ordered an investigation into the contents of monastic and cathedral treasuries.  Shortly thereafter he 
successfully demanded the clergy grant half of their taxable income.  Having encountered resistance 
and slow payment, Edward requested another tenth a year later and summoned individual monastic 
community leaders to attend a special parliament.
84
  While agreeing to meet a national emergency with 
rebellion flaring in Wales and Scotland, the clerical convocation complained that by the increase in 
taxation ‘the king has exhausted the treasure of the church.’85 
For few communities can this have been truer than for Pipewell, where the growing expense of 
daily life and estate administration combined with lofty architectural aspirations and the fiscal 
ambitions of the Crown to impose too great a burden on the monastic purse.  There can be little doubt, 
however, that the spiralling debts owed to the Cahorsins provided the most severe strain.  Despite the 
original potential perceived in their association, for the convent at least these negotiations had brought 
the abbey to its knees.  It may be no coincidence that John de Hillun, who had negotiated the deal, was 
removed from the abbacy on 1 August 1294, a little over six weeks after the merchants had received 
orders to leave the country.
86
  So onerous was this burden that the convent petitioned the General 
Chapter for permission to disperse in 1296.
87
 
 
Ultimately, the convent does not appear to have been dispersed.
88
  But, the petition attests to the 
financial crisis at the abbey and may have been submitted as part of a plan of austerity introduced by 
the new abbot, Richard de Heyham, forced upon him by the king.  Upon forfeiting foreign merchants in 
1294, Edward assumed responsibility for the debts owed to them and demanded the abbey answer him 
for the Cahorsins’ sheep, their issues, and the sale of produce.89  This perhaps introduced new urgency 
into combating debts.  It is possible that Edward found the result unsatisfactory for he appears to have 
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taken the abbey’s goods into his hands late in 1296.90  Whether he also took the abbey into his 
protection is, however, unclear.  Certainly, a series of visitations between 1294 and 1296 had revealed 
crippling debts and allegations of financial irregularity; there must have been concerns over the 
abbey’s short-term future. 
Hillun’s removal in 1294 clearly caused a stir.  A later enquiry taken in the exchequer at 
Michaelmas 1297 reveals that he had been removed at the behest of John of York, abbot of 
Newminster, head of the Cistercian Order in England and father abbot of Pipewell, in the aftermath of 
a visitation to ascertain the exact level of debt and to establish a plan for repayment.
91
  In the next three 
years, the abbey had endured visits from prominent abbots of the Order who had established the debt to 
the Cahorsins at £400.  This suggests that the intervening years from 1291 had witnessed some attempt 
to meet the abbey’s commitment, an impression reinforced by Abbot Richard’s answer to a royal 
inquiry in 1296 that his debt was only £110.  Bitter at his removal, Hillun challenged this account, 
arguing that the established debt of £400 had thus been concealed from the king.  Richard replied that 
his answer represented a fresh debt, he having accounted with the Cahorsins for the larger sum shortly 
after his elevation to the abbacy in October 1294.  Though further inquiries were taken, the results are 
unknown, and the case peters out, although Hillun’s failure to re-appear before the exchequer barons 
suggests he had to be satisfied with his successor’s riposte. 
The years from 1294-9 were anni horribili.  Pipewell, a convent in turmoil headed by an abbot held 
‘in enmity’92 by the Crown, was bound to the king for debts the king perceived as owing to him.  A 
prise of Lent 1297 stripped Pipewell of a further five sacks, five stones.
93
  While the king’s consequent 
debt of £29 5s. 5d. was offset against the £28 19s. 8d. owed of the arrears of the abbey’s debts for the 
Cahorsins’ wool and sheep, repeated petitions only secured the swift repayment promised by the king 
as early as October 1297, fifteen years later, at Trinity 1312.
94
  Dilatory repayment of this kind was 
another consequence of Edward I’s quest for finances as his military campaign in Scotland fed into 
                                                 
90 E 210/8474. 
91 E 159/71, rot. 15d. 
92 ‘de eius inimicicia hiis diebus’: E 159/71, rot. 15d. 
93 Lloyd, Wool Trade, 87-9. 
94 CPR, 1292-1301, 310-11; 1307-13, 289 (23 October 1310); SC 8/297/14816, 315/E196; E 159/85, rot. 26 (Trinity 1312) 
21 
 
renewed strife in Gascony.  Repeated requests for taxes set at high rates in 1297 had provoked 
considerable opposition and had initially induced Edward to threaten his clerical opponents with 
outlawry and sequestration of their goods.
95
  To avoid this fate, some had paid a fine equivalent to one-
fifth of their taxable income.  Eventually, a compromise was negotiated and writs were issued for the 
collection of a fifth of clerical income or one-third of their temporalities without exemption.  By 
Summer 1298, Edward was begging Cistercian abbots for aid and not to take money out of the 
kingdom to general chapters.
96
  Murrain and a series of bad harvests, finally, contributed to the pre-
famine nadir in the fortunes of the abbey.  The accounts rendered to the king demonstrate that in 1296 
and 1297, around 12-15% of the Cahorsin merchants’ sheep were slaughtered due to murrain, a figure 
which tallies with the 15% killed at Wellingborough in 1296.  Sheep sales were not strong either, 
Pipewell receiving only 8d. per ewe compared with around 13d. at Wellingborough.
97
  On the other 
hand, the value of Pipewell’s wool remained high.  In 1296 and 1297, 289 and 322 fleeces were sold at 
4s. 4d. (4.33s.) and 4s. 6d. (4.5s.) per stone respectively when the national average in these years has 
been calculated as 3.62s. and 3.47s.
98
 Disaster, though, struck in 1299.  An inquiry taken in 1306 
revealed that of 423 sheep pertaining to the Cahorsins’ share kept in the abbot’s custody in 1299 only 
sixteen ewes survived.
99
 
 
Guy Barnes, in his study of Kirkstall abbey remarks, however, on the speed and relative 
completeness with which the monks were able to recover after the devastation of their flocks and 
subsequent indebtedness.
100
  Pipewell too, it appears, was able to weather such storms and, when the 
circumstances changed, flourish again.  Old habits and necessities died hard and finances were rebuilt 
by employing the very measures that had led to the brink of disaster.  But, even riding the crest of an 
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economic boom, there remained an undercurrent of debt incurred through advance sale of wool which 
would finally cast the abbey into a catastrophe of worse proportions. 
The abbacy of Andrew de Royewell arguably represented the apogee of Pipewell’s economic 
fortunes.  The ten years from his appointment in 1298 apparently witnessed extensive building projects 
undertaken and completed and, unquestionably, the acceleration of the construction of the new abbey 
precinct.  Andrew presided over the construction and roofing of the stalls of infirmaries for the monks 
and lay brethren, the rere-dorter of the great chamber and its vaults.  Lavish renovations at Braybrooke 
produced a new hall, chapel, kitchen, two chambers and a third ‘ad purgacionem ventri necessaria.’  
Although timber was plentiful in and around the abbey for construction, it is doubtful whether building 
could have been financed in the previous decade and an explanation is required. 
Better climatic conditions and good harvests in the early fourteenth century enabled Andrew to 
create sizeable demesne flocks, herds and grain surpluses.  At his death on 8 August 1308 Pipewell 
possessed sixty ploughs, sixty carthorses and horse-drawn carts, 625 draught animals, 177 milch-cows 
and 126 calves, ten bulls, thirty-one horses, 330 pigs, and fifty-four goats.  According to an estimate 
made at the time, he bequeathed a surplus of 800 quarters of corn and malt to his successor, which must 
have eased the task of feeding the convent.
101
  Most revealingly, he had apparently created a flock of 
2000 sheep of both sexes with 144 lambs.  This would have left the abbey better placed to share in the 
present boom in the wool export trade.
102
  A recoinage in 1299 lifted prices from the slump produced by 
Edward I’s restrictions on the trade.  Before, but most especially after, the Flemish victory at Courtrai in 
1302 and the Anglo-French peace agreement of Montreuil in 1303, demand for wool on continental 
markets rocketed to over 40000 sacks despite the imposition of a new custom on wool exports in 1303. 
Of course, it is difficult to take this particular flock figure wholly at face value.  Two thousand had 
been the exact number specified by the Cahorsins in the renegotiated contract of 1291.  The suspicion 
lingers that the cellarer’s account from which Abbot Nicholas received this information may have been 
invented to match the desired figure.  Andrew himself acted as cellarer and the chronicle suggests he 
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‘had little wool.’103  On the other hand, with no corroborative evidence, it cannot be totally gainsaid.  
Indeed, it may even represent further investment in sheep by William Servat and his fellows.  At the very 
least, it is probably indicative of a real recovery in flock strength at Pipewell.  Andrew was apparently 
able to satisfy a group of Grantham merchants on a ten-year contract made with his predecessor for 100 
sacks.
104
  There appears little reason to believe that this would have been the capacity limit.  It is 
inconceivable that the completion of the abbey church could have been achieved without serious capital 
investment and the probability must be that this had been garnered from the monks’ most marketable 
asset in advance contracts predicated on an expectation of a return on investment. 
 
Dedicated shortly before Easter 1311, the new church symbolised the abbey’s rebirth, but the period 
of buoyancy was woefully short-lived.  Signs of another, more serious downward spiral in fortunes were 
present during moments of prosperity.  On 25 June 1310, the new abbot, Thomas de Thockrington, was 
summoned to appear before the exchequer at the behest of William Servat and Jean de Redole to show 
why he should not fulfil the obligations to them his predecessor had made.
105
  When he appeared on 10 
October, he claimed that he need not answer as the merchants goods had been forfeited as enemies of the 
king, and that subsequently his predecessor had satisfied the king of all debts.  Richard de Heyham, in his 
account with Edward I, had argued that he had satisfied the merchants before answering the king, but 
whether he had been acquitted of all such debts is debatable.  The exchequer barons adjourned the plea to 
scrutinise the rolls, but no result is recorded other than seven further adjournments until 1313.  Whatever 
this implies, Thomas was in a weaker position than Servat. 
While Edward II shared his father’s desire to shield monastic institutions from the worst 
consequences of economic distress, he too promoted the interests of foreign merchants.  Unlike the 
Frescobaldi forced into exile by the Ordainers in 1311, or Antonio Pessagno of Genoa, Edward’s main 
moneyman thereafter, Servat did not court controversy, but remained a reliable financier worthy of 
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reward.  It is probable that, due to his prior good service, Servat had enjoyed a much briefer alienation 
from Edward I in the late-1290s than other Cahorsins.
106
  After the turn of the century he took on much 
greater proximity to the Crown.  Having been pardoned for clipping coin in 1300, he became one of the 
chief mercantile provisioners for the royal household, specialising in wine, spices and wax.
107
  In return, 
he gained access to the issues of the new custom across a number of ports in 1303, the traditional method 
of royal debt repayment, a sinecure Edward II was only too happy to extend repeatedly.
108
  It is doubtful, 
therefore, that recouping his investment made over twenty years ago at Pipewell was critical to his 
survival.  Nevertheless, as we have seen, this had been no ordinary investment and Servat may well have 
exploited his position as ‘king’s merchant’ to secure a return.   
The continued adjournments probably concealed negotiations between the two parties, for Servat and 
Redole persisted in their attempts to broker a settlement.  A petition submitted in April 1314 complained 
that, though they had been satisfied in £69 at the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in 1294, the monks 
claimed this during the merchants’ forfeiture and concealed another £132 6s. 8d. which had been 
advanced to them.
109
  Requests for scrutiny of the exchequer rolls, which experience may have told them 
would find little, were soon reinforced, however, by a direct plea to Edward II’s father-in-law, Philip IV 
of France, who encouraged settlement.
110
  Stung into action, Edward recalled Thomas de Thockrington 
before the exchequer and on 11 June Servat and Redole acknowledged their satisfaction in all debts owed 
to them for sheep and wool.
111
 
This, of course, was a neat legal fiction.  No money changed hands, for in reality it entailed a second, 
far more realistic restructuring of the original wool contract of 1288.  Only twenty-two sacks were to 
change hands over eight years, two sacks in each of the first two years and three in the remaining six.  
The sack price of fifteen marks probably represented both a penalty and recent price deflation.  Three 
stones of clack and locks were to be extracted from each sack and replaced by good wool, ensuring a 
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delivery of higher than normal quality.  An advance of £213 was probably paid as a sign of the 
merchants’ good faith, repayable in annual instalments of £26 12s. 6d., while another £40 was to be 
forwarded in the quinzaine of Easter, which was to be allowed in the delivery of wool.  Although the 
prepared wool was to be handed over at Pipewell, the monks were charged with carriage to Boston, 
possibly to make use of their toll exemptions.  Another 1000 sheep of both sexes were purchased to be 
placed with the abbey’s flock to create a breeding flock as before, but this time of only 1500.  Each year 
the fleeces were to be divided and sold to be reinvested in more sheep.   
This is remarkable testament to both parties’ continued faith in the potential of their association.  For 
William Servat, this was a closing gambit in a campaign he had waged for over twenty years both to 
secure his own investment and to lift the monks out of trouble.  Although they had been accused, and 
perhaps not without justice, of default, the monks were willing to deliver five stones of wool each year to 
William Servat for his robe, thereby tacitly recognising his position as an important patron with the 
mutual obligations that conferred.  As on previous occasions, the monks may have accepted cash at a 
time of crisis, praying that, with the investment in sheep, they could deliver.  It may well have partly been 
this reluctance to cut its losses which brought Pipewell to disaster, though impending environmental 
catastrophe and dire necessity played their part. 
 
The new contract of June 1314 was sealed prior to the most severe agrarian crisis within living 
memory.
112
  Poor harvests at the end of the first decade of the new century had brought grain scarcity and 
higher prices.  Thomas de Thockrington had been compelled to purchase poor quality grain at high prices 
(20s. a quarter) as Pipewell’s estates failed to meet demand.113  Bread was rarely baked in the abbey’s 
ovens and had to be carted from Coventry.  By Midsummer 1314, the climatic indicators of impending 
disaster had multiplied.  The harvest was unusually poor and crops rotted after heavy downpours 
throughout Spring.  Crowland abbey saw its flock shrink by 28% – over 3000 in number – in a new 
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epidemic of murrain.
114
  As in the 1280s, the deal with Servat could have been a pre-emptive gamble to 
combat the disease by slaughter of affected animals and consequent restocking. 
The combination of murrain and worsening famine caused by persistent rains and the consequent 
disastrous harvests over the next two summers ensured that the gamble failed.  In the seven summers 
after 1314 only one produced corn good enough to be milled.  In an attempt to resolve their dilemma, the 
abbot successfully petitioned Edward II for licence to assart, enclose, and bring into cultivation royal 
wastes in Rockingham forest.
115
  Pipewell’s abbots had long brought marginal lands under the plough.116  
But, by the fourteenth century, the fragility of their arable economy had repeatedly been exposed, 
implying that their search for fresh, cultivable land had increasingly taken them into areas less and less 
conducive even to subsistence-level agriculture.  The monks were left to trawl local markets and 
producers, placing severe strain on the monastic budget.  In 1316, the year of worst dearth, grain sold 
nationwide for upwards of 26s. 8d. a quarter, but at Leicester market, which John de Oudeby, the abbey’s 
pantler, was forced to patronise, occasionally only one quarter of wheat would be sold, fetching 40s.
117
  A 
more general murrain also ravaged sheep flocks from 1315-17, meaning that the monks could hardly 
generate income, could not fulfil contracts and were compelled to incur greater obligations to creditors. 
Hamstrung by inadequate demesne production, but bound by obligations to patrons and the poor in 
maintaining chantries and distributing alms, Pipewell abbey became trapped in a vicious circle of debt.  It 
was not alone.  Ian Kershaw has calculated that in 1316, over 100 grants of royal protection were issued 
to penurious monastic institutions.
118
  Neither was it alone in the methods it employed to extricate itself.  
Despite Servat’s purchase of all of the abbey’s wool for eight years in 1314, Thockrington nevertheless 
finally and definitively flouted this monopoly and took money wherever he could find it.  His wool 
attracted suitors from the elite of the Italian mercantile financier community and, although a swift 
recovery in flock numbers could hardly have occurred by 1317, more clement climatic conditions in that 
year and the next perhaps persuaded them that they could access a reliable source at a time of shortage.  
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Over the next four years Pipewell eased its cash-flow crisis by negotiating sizeable advances on the back 
of its best asset. 
On 20 July 1319, the English factors of the Bardi company of Florence purchased eighteen sacks at 
£10 each – the same price as Servat had paid – and perhaps paid 120 marks in advance.119  This 
connection continued a year later when Manento Francisci, former head of the company’s operations in 
England, purchased twenty sacks at £10 a sack.
120
  Of course, as with all wool contracts throughout the 
period in question, the possibility remains that no wool was intended to change hands and that the sum 
paid in advance was purely a loan which might be repaid in wool, but could be repaid in cash.  Although 
Francisci nominally contracted for twenty sacks, he accepted repayment of £200 in cash.  At the same 
moment as the Bardi purchased eighteen sacks, Banquino Bruneleschi of Florence loaned Pipewell eighty 
marks.
121
  On 22 April 1320 the king’s Italian leech, Poncio de Controne, Peregrino Bonoditi de 
Controne, and Niccola Filippi of Lucca forwarded £200.  On the same day Bindo Gili of Florence 
advanced £73, while a day later the Francisci brothers had their recognisance for £200 enrolled.
122
  Two 
months on, Manento Francisci combined with another Florentine, Giovanni Marsopini to lend £400.
123
  
None can be positively linked to sales of wool. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests contracts should be taken at their word and that the merchants 
were keen to exercise claim to depleted monastic wool stocks.  Pipewell apparently delivered eleven 
sacks to Francisci and eight to the Bardi.  Advances at this time may, in fact, have established preferential 
delivery of wool if and when stocks recovered, and may even have been loans to accelerate the recovery 
process in the meantime.  A year before their first wool contract, the Bardi had forwarded 100 marks, 
while just two months before he purchased twenty sacks, Francisci had loaned the abbey £100.
124
  On a 
national level, Italian loans to Cistercian and other notable wool-producing abbeys pre-dominate and 
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some recognisances specify advances are ‘loans’ to be put to the use of the convent.125  While this is 
rather vague and may equally refer to simple sustenance, the quicker monasteries were able to right their 
finances and stocks, the quicker the floundering wool trade might recover and debt could be serviced. 
The European famine caused a dramatic slump in wool demand and exports ran at under 20000 sacks 
a year in 1315.  It struck in the wake of English defeat at Bannockburn in June 1314 and mingled with 
Edward’s abortive attempts to regain hegemony in Scotland and Ireland, where Edward Bruce invaded 
and proclaimed himself king in May 1315, and subsequent rebellions in Glamorgan and at Bristol in 
1316.
126
  For many of the Italian financiers at Edward II’s court, these dual prongs strained finances, for 
he demanded larger loans and purveyances to fund his war efforts.
127
  Between 1312 and 1315, for 
example, Manento Francisci had already received assignments from the exchequer of issues worth over 
£15000 in return for loans to the king as the chief Bardi factor in England.
128
  In 1316, he was 
commissioned to provide 700 quarters of wheat for the Scottish campaign.
129
  His successors, led by 
Roger Ardingelli and Francisco Balducci Pegolotti, kept Edward solvent for the remainder of the decade, 
making huge individual loans, such as the 10000 marks advanced in November 1317.
130
  Their rewards 
were tangible, chief among which was almost monopolistic assignment from the wool customs.
131
  
Assisting struggling monasteries, many of whom particularly in the Cistercian Order were among the 
leading producers of the best quality wool in the British Isles, thus made obvious sense. 
Pipewell was merely one link in these chains of credit.  The Bardi were certainly prominent creditors 
in Northamptonshire and Warwickshire, lending 70m 6s. 8d. to Sulby shortly after its first surviving loan 
to Pipewell and eighty marks to Combe in August 1319.
132
  They were also active elsewhere, Francisci 
                                                 
125 E 159/91, rot. 73d. – loan of £140 (18 October 1317) by Banquino Bruneleschi of Florence to Bruern ‘ad ardua negocia 
domus sue inde expedienda’; E 159/92, rot. 60d. – loan of eighty marks (1 August 1319) to Combe ‘pro arduis nostris 
negociis domus et ecclesie nostre inde expediendis et promovendis .’ 
126 R.M. Haines, King Edward II: His Life, His Reign and its Aftermath, 1284-1330 (Montreal, 2003), 98-101, 289. 
127 The mission of Roger Mortimer to Ireland in April 1317 was partly financed by Antonio Pessagno of Genoa and the Bardi: 
CPR, 1313-17, 608. 
128 CCR, 1307-13, 403, 405-6, 407; 1313-18, 33, 114, 118, 121-2, 144-5; CFR, 1307-19, 158, 168, 178, 186; CPR, 1313-17, 11, 
19, 106-7. 
129 CCR, 1313-18, 383. 
130 CPR, 1317-21, 55, 59. 
131 CPR, 1313-17, 608, 672-3; 1317-21, 9, 11, 15-16, 127; CCR, 1313-18, 492. 
132 E 159/92, rots. 60d. (28 July 1318), 89. 
29 
 
advancing 200 marks to Vaudey on the day before he loaned Pipewell £200.
133
  Bruern took £154 17s. 4d. 
from the Bardi on 20 October 1317, two days after it had received £140 from Banquino Bruneleschi.
134
  
Bruneleschi himself loaned at least £430 to Sawtry (Hunts.), Warden and the Gilbertine house of 
Chicksands (Beds.) in November 1317.
135
  What overall effect such a flow of credit in the direction of 
wool-producing houses had can only be guessed, but between 1319 and 1321, wool exports rose to over 
30000.
136
 
So acute were the financial problems at many houses, however, that the credit expansion created as 
many problems as it attempted to resolve.  Loans had to be repaid and often at harsh terms.  Pipewell’s 
loans from Controne and Gili had to be met within eight months.  Debts were increasingly incurred to 
service other credit obligations and the consequences could be drastic, particularly when the better 
harvests of 1317 and 1318 and the retreat of the sheep murrain proved false dawns as the rains returned 
and with them rinderpest, which decimated stocks of draught animals across the country.
137
  Crops rotted 
in the fields and a subsistence crisis ensued.   
In January 1320 Pipewell endured a visitation from John of Whelpington, abbot of Newminster.
138
  
He established Pipewell’s debt at £469 20s. 10d., around the level it had been in 1296, permitting the 
monks to sell the abbey’s goods to meet debts.  The abbey chronicle reveals that this would have availed 
them little, for the full extent of their debts had been concealed from their visitor, a marginal note 
estimating the true total at £1118 3s. 4d., which is a more accurate assessment.  Whether such deceit or 
more general despair at his decision-making brought about the deposition of Thomas de Thockrington on 
1 January 1321 is difficult to say.
139
  His strategy of taking Italian silver did bind the abbey to outside 
forces and made extricating it from ever decreasing circles of debt more problematic.  In an effort to meet 
contract obligations to foreign merchants the abbey had purchased wool worth 100 marks from Roger 
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Belers, a local Leicestershire landowner and retainer of Thomas, earl of Lancaster, cousin and most 
prominent critic of Edward II.  Belers extorted a £100 annuity from the abbey and a pledge of the granges 
of Elkington and Cold Ashby.
140
  Furthermore, in November 1321, Giovanni Marsopini and Asselino 
Simonetti of Lucca loaned 200 marks to have first refusal on the abbey’s goods to be sold off to meet its 
debts.
141
  The vultures, it appeared, were now circling. 
Despite an initial determination to meet his predecessor’s obligations, William of Lawford, the new 
abbot, soon succumbed to debt.  In the first month of his rule he procured the cancellation of the 
recognisances to the Contrones and Bindo Gili, wiping £273 from calculation.
142
  He was also able to 
deliver eleven sacks to Francisci and eight of the eighteen sacks owed to the Bardi.  It is worth 
remembering, though, that such cancellations did not necessarily imply full payment.  Francisci only 
finally agreed to annul his agreement three years after it had technically been settled in August 1323.  The 
Bardi, moreover, exacted a penalty of £40 for a false weighing of the delivered wool and for failure to 
carry it to the delivery point at Stamford, although they were willing to loan a further £50 on 9 February 
1321.
143
  This last loan highlights the quandary into which every abbot of Pipewell had fallen over the 
past forty years – no matter how straitened the circumstances, the repeated acceptance of liquid capital to 
sustain the brethren and their obligations made the light at the end of the tunnel seem closer irrespective 
of the likely consequences.  For Lawford, though, these consequences brought scandal and lasting 
infamy. 
He was singularly unfortunate that his elevation to the abbacy coincided with the worst of the crisis 
years.  Another deluge had ruined the harvest in 1320, while drought brought renewed crop failures and 
famine in 1321.
144
  Wool exports slumped to only 18000 sacks.
145
  The only solution apparent was that 
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proposed by the abbot of Newminster in 1320.  The abbey’s assets had to be sold off for the brethren’s 
survival. 
Historians have long viewed the early fourteenth century as a watershed in the Cistercian and 
national agrarian economy.  David Knowles commented that the monks were ‘gradually going over from 
direct exploitation … to rents and leases.’146  In 1293 the General Chapter legislated to permit land 
exchanges and alienations without its licence and in 1315 authorised leases to laymen for life if the 
benefits were manifest.
147
  James Donnelly has argued that leases of granges at Fountains, Furness, 
Meaux and Whalley, helped finance debt repayments without incurring further charges.
148
  On broader 
social levels, Barbara Harvey believes that land transactions took place in times of greatest dearth, as 
sellers attempted to gain sufficient liquidity to survive crises.
149
  At Pipewell, however, the impression is 
that the loss of the keystones of the economy, whatever the short-term benefit, proved insufficient to 
improve the abbey’s finances. 
The abbey chronicle details goods sold off to service debts
150
: wool worth £30; the produce of 
fishponds worth £19; five large basins for £7; the produce of felling trees worth £110.  More seriously, 
demises for immediate profit reduced the income-generating capacity of the abbey’s demesne and 
seigneurial rights and brought in less than expected.  Two barns at Braybrooke and Dunchurch were sold 
for £20, while 20s. accrued from the sale of a cowshed at Dunchurch.  At Marham the monks intended to 
demise their land to Robert of Lawford for 26s. 8d., but ‘propter sterilitatem’ at Easter 1321 he would 
only pay 20s.  Conversely, Robert purchased the mill at Church Lawford for eight quarters of grain and 
an annual mulcture, but made material improvements, spending more than the monks on repairs. 
The most instantly profitable demise came on 3 November 1321, the very day upon which Simonetti 
and Marsopini asserted their right to first refusal on the abbey’s goods.151  After considerable wrangling 
in London and a dispute with the convent over its sale, Augustine le Waleys received possession of the 
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grange of Cold Ashby, rendering £180 in advance.  Apart from this lump sum, this sale is significant as it 
perhaps marks a sea-change in the abbey’s attitude to finance and a longer-term search for more local 
patrons better placed to reduce the charges on the monks.  On 14 February 1321 Abbot William demised 
the grange at Elkington to William Tekne, burgess of Northampton.
152
  Elkington suffered badly during 
the famine years and could no longer support more than a handful of the abbey’s beasts.153  In return for 
William’s commitment to undertake repairs and, more importantly in the immediate short-term, a loan of 
grain, malt, and ale, worth £100, the grange was demised to him rent-free for a term of nine years.  
Disquiet in the convent about this sale prompted the negotiation of a new lease.  In return for establishing 
the abbey’s debt to him for foodstuffs at £200 in the court of the King’s Bench, William received the 
grange for nine years at an annual render of ninety marks, as well as forty quarters of corn in the first 
year, fifty quarters in the second, and sixty year on year for the remaining seven years.  Throughout this 
term, moreover, William was to find pasture and fodder for 300 ewes and their issue at Calewelhilcote.  
Sheep, after all, were the lifeblood of Pipewell’s economy.  William Servat died in 1320 and with him 
any hope of further Cahorsin investment in the abbey’s stock at a time of real desperation.  Nevertheless, 
this did not deter Pipewell from seeking patrons willing to enter into a business relationship of this kind.   
On 8 June 1321, Abbot William demised the grange of Newbold-on-Avon to John and Henry, sons of 
Hugh de Merynton, merchant of Coventry, at an annual rent of £8.
154
  By July 1322, he appears to have 
granted Hugh £20 of annual rent from Cawston and Dunchurch granges.  He also leased the manor of 
Cawston for £40 on condition that Hugh manage grain production and pasture, but only take his profit in 
corn, hay, and grass after the abbey had repaid him this sum, thereby passing the costs of production onto 
a party with greater liquidity, but without prejudicing their subsistence needs.
155
  Coventry lies a short 
distance from Pipewell’s Warwickshire granges and Hugh had moved into the abbey’s orbit over a 
number of years.  Around the time of the initial demise of Newbold, Hugh received from the Bardi the 
abbey’s as yet unfulfilled obligation for twelve of the eighteen sacks Thomas de Thockrington had agreed 
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to deliver in July 1319.
156
  Shortly thereafter Abbot William agreed to sell Hugh sixty sacks of wool and 
sixty fleeces over the next ten years.
157
  This may equate with the contract related in the abbey chronicle 
for forty-five sacks, at ten marks a sack, over seven-and-a-half years.
158
  Revealingly, this contract 
committed the monks to paying Hugh and his wife an annuity of 40s. in return for his purchase for them 
of 100 sheep.  An advance of twenty marks was made on condition that the monks re-invest it in the 
purchase of more sheep. 
As with the contract which overshadowed Pipewell’s financial dealings during this period, the monks 
did not invest as they should have done.  For all Merynton, Waleys, and Tekne offered, the level of their 
investment could not offset climatic catastrophe and the crippling level of long-standing debt, as it 
necessitated the removal of production units from the monastic economy and the consequent obligation 
for further debts.  On 28 April 1322, Edward II took Pipewell into his protection.  Just under a year later, 
on 24 April 1323, William of Lawford, presumably pressured by monks nourished only by black bread 
and potage and despairing of a revival in the abbey’s fortunes, resigned his rule.  Only four months later, 
on 13 September, ‘per … pondera oneris domus sancte Marie pervenit ad ultimum punctum inedie ac 
paupertatis’, and was dispersed for three years.159 
 
In her study of the late thirteenth century bankruptcies at Rievaulx, Emilia Jamroziak not only dispels 
the notion that the monks’ ill-fated forays into the wool market represented a growing departure from the 
Cistercian orthodoxy, she goes a long way in exonerating the convent of the charge of mismanagement.
160
  
Cash-strapped monasteries were drawn into marketing their primary saleable asset – wool – to sustain 
higher living costs, royal taxation, and to fund projects to the greater glory of God and their own 
community.  When environmental calamities and endemic outbreaks of disease combined to decimate 
flocks, indebtedness became a ‘way of life’.  Nowhere more than Pipewell would appear to better 
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corroborate this argument, but can an assessment of its finances conclude by similarly exonerating the 
monks? 
It is undeniable that the four decades either side of the turn of the fourteenth century represent one of 
the most turbulent periods in English economic history and of Cistercian involvement in that economy.  
Pipewell, whose monks repeatedly struggled to raise sufficient surpluses of grain from its increasingly 
marginal lands, experienced the wide fluctuations between dizzying booms of buoyant demand and good 
prices for its wool and spiralling lows marked by bovine and ovine pestilence and famine.  Taxation too, 
in adding to the rising burden of debt, threatened to swamp the community with commitments it could 
not fulfil.  It is probably best to let the monks describe the combined effects.   
A petition from the abbot and convent tells of the damage wrought by the recent years of dearth and 
by murrain and of the recurrent threat of dispersal.
161
  In response to the latest tax demand, they claim 
that their old assessment now exceeds the annual revenue of the lands still in their hands and request 
they be taxed on what they have, at least until the king has received what is due to him from a lay 
twentieth.  Without re-assessment they would not be able to maintain the chantries and alms with 
which their founders and patrons had charged them and would have to disperse.
162
  Of course, the 
monks knew exactly which buttons to press.  Exaggerating their case or the possible consequences 
might tug more firmly at the royal heartstrings.  Sadly, this was definitely not the case, the king 
refusing the request as he ‘ad tant a faire de ses deners qil ne les puisse mie respiter.’  References to 
the concurrent clerical tenth and lay twentieth and the ravages over the years date it most probably to 
1327/8, making it doubtful that they were cynically manipulating Edward III.
163
  Pamela Nightingale 
has shown that the years 1325-9 was one of the worst periods in Norfolk’s history with a return of 
heavy rains and disease – thus is was not just the monks of Pipewell who were struggling with bad 
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163 W.M. Ormrod, ‘The crown and the English economy, 1290-1348,’ in Before the Black Death, 161; Lay Taxes in England and 
Wales, 1188-1688, ed. M. Jurkowski, C.L. Smith & D. Crook (Richmond, 1998), 36.  The only other plausible year is 1316, but 
references to the demises discussed above, which mainly occurred towards the beginning of the 1320s, militate against this. 
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weather and murrain.
164
  It is likely that even after its reconstitution, which probably occurred 
simultaneously with the cancellation of long-standing recognisances to the Bardi in June 1326
165
, 
Pipewell abbey continued to suffer from chronic indebtedness. 
It is hard, though, to believe that the monks who submitted this petition could have been wholly 
forgiving of their predecessors.  Their plea emphasises that previous abbots had leased lands and 
possessions in return for money paid in advance in order, so they said, to evade dispersal.
166
  The 
convent had witnessed the loss of many of its most valuable production units.  Early in Edward III’s 
reign, it negotiated with Thomas Latimer to quash a demise made to him in 1318 of lands in 
Braybrooke.
167
  Moreover, William of Lawford’s confessed submission to temptation in entering into 
the recognisances which caused the abbey’s dispersal served as a salutary reminder to the monks of 
their forebears’ actions and their consequences.  Jamroziak questions whether Rievaulx’s monks, in 
simultaneously taking on wool contracts for over eighty sacks a year, an impossible burden, were ‘risk-
loving investors’, unscrupulously taking Italian lucre knowing they could fall back on royal 
protection.
168
  While she answers in the negative, even a fraction of the commitments Thockrington and 
Lawford entered into from 1317-23 would have been impossible to meet, stock levels falling to terrible 
lows.  In January 1321 Thomas bequeathed his successor only 45% of the affers, 15% of the plough 
oxen, 7% of the milch-cows and, most importantly, 33% of the sheep which he had received in 1308 
from Andrew de Royewell.  By April 1323, William possessed only 54% of the affers, 21% of the 
plough oxen and 43% of the sheep Thomas had left.
169
  It may have been that they were deceitfully 
taking money and not using it for the intended purposes. 
Abbot Nicholas, or his apologist, certainly looked back on his experiences in the convent during 
this period with considerable regret.  Remarking on the deal with Hugh de Merynton, in which the 
abbey received twenty marks in advance, he argues that, had it been used to buy more sheep, the 
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church of Pipewell would have considerably benefited.
170
  Accusations of deceit pervade accounts of 
the abbey’s recent history; three abbots resigned, or were forced to resign, their office shrouded in debt 
and controversy.  Richard de Heyham, Andrew de Royewell, and Thomas de Thockrington were also 
accused of concealing the full nature of their debts, while secret alienations and private sales of timber 
against the convent’s consent are attributed to most of Nicholas’s predecessors.171  Shortly before the 
dispersal, too, the abbey apparently succeeded in quashing the Cahorsin contract for only two marks 
‘per viam dexteram sinistram’ after the death of Servat’s executor, John de Stoketon.172  Even 
accounting for the chronicle’s slanted view of history, successive abbots had long aimed to cast off this 
debt. 
There is little question that the Cahorsin deal was the most important factor behind the financial 
difficulties faced by Pipewell abbey.  It hung in a Damocletian manner over the monks who repeatedly 
took the Cahorsins’ investment, but persistently reneged on their obligations.  And yet, it is unlikely 
that it was a relationship founded on deceit, being instead intended to give both parties long-term 
security and stability.  Formed at a time of stock shortages and disease, this business relationship 
offered the possibility of establishing a breeding flock to outlast the current crisis and a firmer 
foundation for future prosperity.
173
  Their quality product enabled the monks to attract investors who 
were not solely interested in quick returns.  Regardless of the financial drain subsequent defaults and 
legal entanglements caused, investment in sheep purchases and advance payments suggest that the 
Cahorsins would not forsake the potential profitability of this arrangement.  William Servat, moreover, 
in obtaining a stake in the future direction of the abbey, had perhaps even become bound into the 
abbey’s patronage network.  Intriguingly, after the convent’s dispersal, a visitation decreed that as the 
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 Whilst Pipewell took a risk with its most valuable asset, wool, to attempt to survive, other European monasteries used other 
creative financial techniques to keep solvent during this period of crisis.  For example, a German-Danish house, Klosster 
Reinbek sold a village to a lay donor in 1316, and numerous other houses were forced to alienate their property, either for limited 
periods or in perpetuity: Jordan, Great Famine, 65-67.  In modern finance terms these institutions were mortgaging, or on 
occasion liquidating, their real estate portfolios to access the cash they needed for daily survival. 
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Cahorsins had not been satisfied the monks would offer daily prayers for them and the rest of their 
benefactors at the altar of St Michael.
174
 
Throughout Pipewell’s recent history, therefore, there was unrivalled evidence for a desire to 
establish a sustainable economy centred on wool production and to attract patrons from a wider 
community.  The Cahorsins were replaced in this scheme by Hugh de Merynton.  The downside was the 
potential this had to throw the monks into the hands of outsiders who did not have their best interests at 
heart.  Bad luck and unrealistic expectations of their flocks drove them into a vicious circle, where their 
original need for money for subsistence and future expansion were subsumed by the desire to counter 
increasing poverty and new debts incurred to service old debts; as the circle constricted, they went further 
and further into trouble.  But, although it became ‘easy to take, but hard to give’, the ends justified the 
means. 
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